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The Burgundy Circle’s plans to undermine Louis XIV’s absolute state through 
polysynody and the high nobility  
 
I 
 
Louis, duc de Bourgogne (1682 - 1712) was briefly Dauphin of France from April 1711 until his 
death from measles in March 1712.  The eldest grandson of Louis XIV, Bourgogne’s premature 
demise was immediately viewed as a lost opportunity to reform an ailing French monarchy.  
Surrounded by a small band of notable advisers and reformers known to posterity as the 
Burgundy Circle, this group had spent several years planning a reorganisation of Louis XIV’s 
‘absolutist’ sovereignty in favour of a decentralised and expanded government.  While revisionist 
historians have made it clear that France was never fully centralised under Louis XIV and 
therefore not subject to ‘absolutism’, his kingship was defined by an aspiration for the crown to 
be independent in action.  The accompanying crown propaganda proved so successful that the 
king’s subjects and his European neighbours bought into the notion that the French monarch 
enjoyed complete control over his state.  Crucially, the ancient noblesse d’épée (nobility of the 
sword) assumed this to be the case too, believing they had been excluded from power by Louis 
XIV and replaced by the newer administrative noblesse de robe (nobility of the robe).  Despite 
the revisionist claim that many épée nobles were utilised by Louis XIV during his reign, from the 
1680s a significant number felt side-lined at a time of economic, social, religious and political 
turmoil.  Amongst them, the Burgundy Circle formed an important group of high nobles who 
opposed many of Louis XIV’s later policies.  Containing members of the court and 
administration, they were well placed to understand the task facing a king of France.  Often 
rebuffed by Louis XIV when proffering assistance in matters of state, some of the duc de 
Bourgogne’s educators engaged in a long-term strategy to indoctrinate the prince to remedy 
France’s ills when he became king.  Through a discussion of the political theory of the group’s 
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key members, this article will reject their portrayal as promoting a reactionary revival of 
aristocratic fortunes, instead arguing that the Burgundy Circle aspired to enlarge and devolve 
government.1  Moreover, it will be shown that rather than possessing a single cohesive ideology, 
the Circle contained several visions of a future France.  To challenge elements of the revisionist 
view that absolutism in France was a ‘myth’, it will be first necessary to delineate the 
historiographical understanding of Louis XIV’s sovereignty and the perceived fortunes of the 
noblesse de épée.   
II 
Absolutism has been described as ‘freedom for the monarch in practise from institutional checks 
on his power’; although no ‘single European model’ ever possessed a truly absolute ruler.2  Such 
a view overturned a belief extant in historiography from the nineteenth century onwards that 
Europe had experienced a number of absolute rulers during the early modern period, and that 
Louis XIV had been the apogee of this form of sovereignty.  This older interpretation was ‘an 
historical construction’ that depicted an ‘ancien régime’ France as moving towards absolutism from 
the fifteenth or sixteenth century.3  Shaped in part by the conceptual emergence of the state as a 
‘public thing’ (res publica) or independent entity,4 absolutism was a means for the crown to gain 
control of the state, the nobility, and its subjects.  Reacting to the internecine civil and religious 
French Wars of Religion (1562 - 98), this process began in earnest during the reigns of Henri IV 
(r. 1589 - 1610) and his son Louis XIII (r. 1610 - 43).  Under the latter’s First Minister Cardinal 
Richelieu (1585 - 1642) especially, the French crown accelerated the process of state 
centralisation.  Religious, military and economic pressures saw the crown concentrate power at 
the centre of government as the autonomy of its representative institutions (parlements, estates, 
etc.) were reduced.  Richelieu and his successor as First Minister, Cardinal Mazarin (1602 - 61), 
sought to protect the state by enabling the king to act in any manner that was seen to be 
beneficial during extraordinary times.5  While reacting to sixteenth century disorder and the 
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economic demands of the Thirty Years’ War (1618 - 48), increased crown power was designed to 
to pull authority away from the high nobility, particularly within the provinces.  So asserted 
crown supremacy was seen as offering unity and security after fractious religious, civil and 
provincial hostilities, plus a need to overcome the potential threat posed by the épée.  Emerging 
from this was a system that relied on intendants responsible to the royal council, and from 1643 
an upper council (conseil d’en haut) which trusted a handful of chief ministers and robe advisers to 
counsel the king on matters of state.  The consequence of this transformation in government 
was the development of a mechanism headed by an autocratic and independent king, which 
curtailed the nobility’s power by depending on a non-épée administration and allowed many 
provincial governments to stultify. 
     This reading of French absolutism has been rejected as a ‘myth’.6  Two key objections arise in 
relation to the notion that the French king employed absolutism: first, the definition of the term 
‘absolutism’; and second, the true extent of the king’s authority and power.  Concerning the first 
objection, it has been noted that the term ‘absolutism’ was not contemporary and was coined 
only in the 1820s.7  At which time its association with the absolute monarchy of Spain had meant 
that it accrued negative connotations, seen as the ‘autocratic enemy of consent, the despotic foe 
of popular rights and liberties, the bureaucratic subverter of society’s natural elites’.8  
Anachronistic historiography placed contemporary labels (or ‘isms’) on an ancien régime that 
had failed during the 1789 French Revolution due to its corruption, restrictive centralising 
behaviour, despotism, and (Whiggish) ill comparison with the success of the British monarchy.  
It is also pointed out that the pejorative term of ‘absolutism’ misunderstood what ‘absolute’ 
sovereignty actually meant: the established capacity in European states (including England) that 
made a monarch’s decisions final, and their capability to employ prerogative powers in 
emergencies.9  According to the misinterpretation, absolutism allowed Louis XIV to conceive 
‘himself to be above the positive laws of the land, not responsible to his people and their 
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institutions, although acknowledging “higher” constraints’.10  This outdated depiction of French 
‘absolutism’ as eschewing the constitutional apparatus of the state to gain greater (despotic) 
control of the state and its subjects was erroneous.  
     The second objection consolidated the first.  Revisionist historians have shown that at no 
stage did Louis XIV gain independence from the other apparatus of state.  Louis XIV carefully 
fostered an ‘illusion of strong monarchy’, purposely cultivating a ‘façade’ of absolute power, 
engendered for a domestic public and foreign audience through propaganda, diplomacy, war and 
the construction of the palace at Versailles.11  Past historians made the mistake of assuming that 
Louis XIV needed to pursue absolutism in order to secure order following the Frondes (1648 - 
53): a civil war in which a broad range of social groups reacted to the aggressive policies of 
Mazarin.  In truth, the parlement de Paris that had risen up during the first Frondes helped to 
restore order in the second, and many of the leading nobles who had rebelled had been 
propitiated.12  The crown did not possess the infrastructure, resources, communications, or 
widespread unity within its provincial territories to impose absolutism.13  Instead the crown 
succeeded in promoting its policies and authority through a conciliatory tactic in which it co-
operated with its provinces and their government apparatus (estates, parlements, nobility, etc.) to 
secure the enactment of its policy and obtain provincial loyalty.14  Operating within the 
constitutional framework, the crown drew power into the centre but managed to retain the co-
operation of the wider government apparatus and keep the nobility ‘quiescent’.15  More 
controversial limitations on the constitutional elements of the state such as the 1673 edict that 
prevented the parlements from remonstrating the king’s laws prior to enactment, were passed 
using the king’s emergency prerogatives as the nation was at war with the Dutch (1672 - 78).  
Louis XIV’s reign, therefore, exhibited no innovative or revolutionary tendencies, remaining a 
traditional monarchy that strived for greater authority and independence.16    
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     This perspective is not universally accepted however.  A number of scholars have argued that 
there was an absolutist agenda in France that was largely achieved under Louis XIV.17  While the 
need for compromise with provincial governments and the elites prevented absolutism from 
being all pervasive, ideologically it was an attempt to restore the structures of monarchical 
authority that was largely successful.18  The crown’s concessionary attitude allowed it to develop 
an inadequate state bureaucracy in order to engage in economic reform hastened by a number of 
European wars from 1672.  More importantly, absolutism allowed Louis XIV to emphasise the 
crown’s pre-eminence after the scarring experience of the Frondes.  The Frondes taught Louis 
XIV some hard lessons.  After the death of Mazarin in 1661 he considered it essential for him to 
rule alone at the apex of government (and society) without a First Minister, in complete control 
of state decisions.  This meant the stultification of any opposition to his authority and a 
commitment to underlining his power over all other groups, corporations, and state machinery.  
Louis’s drive to locate the king at the centre of government was a continuation of earlier crown 
policy under his predecessors, particularly at the expense of the high nobility (and parlement de 
Paris).19  As Louis XIV explained in his Mémoires, he had no intention of sharing his authority 
with those of high birth no matter how difficult this was for them to digest.20 
     French kings had attempted to overcome the authority, independence and provincial power 
of the high nobility and princes of blood for generations.  Yet where Louis XIV differed was his 
ability to efficaciously retard their challenges while side-lining their influence on government 
policy.  By retaining their rights and privileges and offering them ‘prestigious but purely 
ceremonial posts’ at court,21 Louis’s lack of antagonism towards the elite made them acquiescent.  
Louis XIV’s accomplishment should be viewed as an ability to extend his power and control 
over government, while resisting challenges to his authority.  His absolute sovereignty was 
thereby political in nature; an ideology or form of rule that the French and wider Europe bought 
6 
 
into.  It did not overturn the constitution but manipulated it to manage the organism of the state 
and its opposition, while centralising the government around Louis XIV.22       
III 
This management of the princes of blood and the high nobility appears to have been initially 
successful.  Buoyed by his decision not to employ a First Minister after difficult years under 
Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, the épée were willing to support the young king from 1661.  
The parlements also readily co-operated with the crown for their duties as law courts and rights 
and privileges were not inhibited.  From 1661 to 1672 France predominantly enjoyed years of 
peace, permitting administrative reorganisation while embarking on economic developments 
under the direction of the Controller-General, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619 - 83).  As will be 
discussed below, these reforms concentrated on a mercantilist policy designed to generate 
revenues by attracting European coinage into France at the expense of her rivals, notably the 
Dutch and the English.  Yet from 1672 a succession of draining wars fought over the next four 
decades placed heavy economic and financial burdens on the state and its people; a state still 
convalescing from the Thirty Years’ War and the Frondes.  Colbert’s earlier policies to overcome 
‘economic depression’ by strengthening ‘manufactures, commerce and agriculture’ had been 
‘geared’ towards peace, and war undermined these plans especially after Colbert’s death.23   
     By the 1680s opposition to government began to emerge as France experienced economic 
and financial problems, exacerbated by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685).  Louis 
XIV’s decision to overturn Henri IV’s edict (1598) granting Huguenots the freedom to practise 
Protestantism free from state persecution led over 200,000 Huguenots (many of them skilled 
craftsman) to leave France.  The widespread revulsion generated across Europe by the ensuing 
persecution (of Protestants),24 juxtaposed with fears that France’s aggrandising foreign policy 
sought to create a universal monarchy under Louis XIV led to criticism at home and abroad.  
The 1680s therefore witnessed a more tangible, incipient opposition to the crown’s model of 
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sovereignty.  While censorship and prosecution made this difficult, works began to appear that 
questioned the direction of the French state.  In Les soupirs de la France esclave, qui aspire aprés la 
liberté (1689), the Huguenot exile Pierre Jurieu argued that the king’s loss of focus on his (divinely 
appointed) duty to preserve the public good had been caused by his excessive elevation in 
status.25  Such power separated him from his people, while excessive taxation had oppressed the 
country through slavery and poverty exposing the rule of a tyrant.26     
     Louis XIV’s deliberate positioning of himself at the centre of government and decision to be 
personally responsible for approving governmental decisions has been seen as galvanising 
opposition against the king.  Many previous kings, such as Louis XIII, would frequently hide 
behind their ministers, making them become culpable for errant policies.  Louis XIV’s 
determination to become accountable at the centre of government had been originally calculated 
to render royal authority more effective.  And during the peaceful 1660s and successes in war 
during the 1670s the king’s position was unproblematic, as minsters continued to be blamed for 
minor issues.  From the 1680s until his death when difficulties were more manifest, Louis 
attracted greater criticism to ‘his own head’ when he came to be seen as personally responsible 
for French difficulties.27  The perception of some high nobles of a state in crisis, witnessed a 
resurgence of desire to regain their hereditary position within the French constitution and not 
stand apart from government.28   
     As state centralisation had removed the ‘disobedient and politically unreliable’ high nobility 
throughout the seventeenth century, the crown had become deliberately reliant on its ministers 
and the robe nobility.29  Yet the épée felt that this had set them ‘ideologically apart’ from the 
constitution, extinguishing the important role they occupied as a balancing agent between the 
king and his people.30  Ladurie has argued that the new pre-eminence of the robe in government 
led to dismay in the épée over the relationship between status and power amongst the nobility.  
For while the épée were still viewed as possessing the status to which the robe aspired, the robe 
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had acquired the power the épée coveted.31  It is true that many of the épée would not have 
accepted roles of office deeming it to be beneath them,32 but some longed for a return to the 
(ancient) power they had once enjoyed in the state and now saw placed in the hands of the 
ministers and members of the (new) robe nobility.  It is also correct for revisionists to point to 
the épée’s influential role both in the provinces, the army, and at court (advising the king 
privately).  But this unduly mitigates a deep-seated feeling they had been replaced in the state.  
From the 1680s some thought they did not have enough sway over the direction of government, 
at a time when they viewed the robe as mismanaging the administration. 
     Ironically, the Burgundy Circle who most vociferously pushed an agenda of épée re-
integration in government at court possessed the only ministerial member of the high nobility.  
Paul de Beauvilliers, duc de Saint-Aignan (1648 – 1714), was a trusted adviser of Louis XIV and 
a member of the Conseil d’en haut.  He was also a son-in-law of Colbert, and his wife’s sister 
married his friend Charles Honoré d'Albert de Luynes (1646 - 1712), duc de Chevreuse.  And 
while Chevreuse was not an official minister, he was a close adviser to the king who had access 
to him day and night.33  In 1689 the two men were given the great honour of acting as governors 
to Louis’s three grandsons: the duc de Bourgogne, his brother the duc d’Anjou (1683 - 1746), 
later King Philip V of Spain, and the duc de Berry (1686 - 1714).  Beauvilliers and Chevreuse 
employed their friend, counsellor and the future Archbishop of Cambrai, François de Salignac de 
la Mothe-Fénelon (1650 - 1715) as preceptor, and the ecclesiastical historian Claude Fleury (1640 
- 1723) as sub-preceptor.  Beauvillier and Chevreuse were friends with another member of the 
Circle, the famous diarist and member of the court at Versailles Louis de Rouvroy (1675 - 1755), 
duc de Saint-Simon, who was a friend to the adult Bourgogne and a childhood friend of Philippe 
II, the duc d’Orléans and future regent of France (1674 - 1723).  Added to this group for the 
purpose of this article is the abbé Charles-Irénée Castle de Saint-Pierre (1658 - 1743).  A 
peripheral member of the Circle and not close to Bourgogne, but one who was a satellite of the 
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group and made a concerted effort to create plans that incorporated a shared theoretical pillar, 
namely the polysynody.  
     At this juncture it should be noted that recent research has shown that the idea of polysynody 
– the extended use of government councils to advise the king and expand government - was not 
one that originated in the Burgundy Circle.  Moreover, its development in practise and as an 
(intellectual) concept poses questions for the extent of Louis XIV’s ‘absolutism’.  Dupilet and 
Sarmant claim that polysynody was actually a part of an evolving mechanism used by the French 
ministry that reveals reform within Louis XIV’s government during the early eighteenth 
century.34  Polysynody was first proposed by Paul Hurault de l’Hopital, seigneur de Belesbat (d. 
1706) in a letter to Louis XIV in October 1699.  Drawing on the French monarchy’s traditional 
use of extended council, Belesbat wanted to tackle administrative deficiencies that had been 
exacerbated by wars, the excessive tax inequality that placed the burden on the poor, and 
religious persecution by incorporating more voices (from a range of backgrounds) to council the 
king.35  While Belesbat’s reorganisation was declined by Louis XIV, the proposal was not a secret 
within the upper-levels of the ministry.  The idea of a polysynody quickly found a home in the 
Board of Commerce (1701), which used a council including locally elected members (aldermen 
and merchants) to work with commissioners and Secretaries of State who relied on their 
expertise when framing commercial policy. Furthermore, Louis XIV’s Chancellor Louis 
Phélypeaux (1643 - 1727), comte de Pontchartrain, began to produce plans in 1711 for 
government polysynody when the death of Bourgogne made a regency inevitable.  Pontchartrain 
had been commissioned by Louis XIV to examine future options, and he developed a system of 
eight polysynodic councils that would aid the regency government, train future ministers and 
lessen the chaos of Louis XIV’s death by increasing the number of advisors – like Belesbat, 
based on ability rather than status - in government during the regency period only.36  The 
existence of other models of polysynody suggests several key interventions. Firstly, it illustrates 
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that Louis XIV’s government was not a stagnant ‘ministerial despotism’ because it was 
innovating until the king’s death. Secondly, the concept of polysynody was not new. It was used 
in Europe and evolved from the old French system as part of a long tradition of reform and 
reliance on wider council (in times of need). Finally, knowledge within the ministry of the 
polysynody may well have been shared, and it seems likely that the Burgundy Circle adapted 
Belesbat’s reforming agenda by adding an aristocratic focus with greater general participation to 
augment the bien public.37  This centrality of the public good and the permanent expansion of 
government by polysynody, however, demarcated a clear division between the Burgundy Circle 
and Pontchartrain’s (ministerial) vision: which limited the duration of the project to the regency 
and did not wish to undermine the king’s authority by reactivating the Estates-General.  
     The Burgundy Circle has been viewed as one of three cabals at the court surrounding the king 
at Versailles.  These cabals were generational in origin: the first surrounded Louis XIV and his 
consort Madame de Maintenon (1635 - 1719); the second was centred on the king’s son Louis, le 
Grand Dauphin (1661 - 1711), and the third was Bourgogne’s circle.  The first two have been 
described as larger ‘hostile allies’ - opposed to the Circle - containing the main power and 
connections which included hundreds of governments technocrats, military leaders, key 
ministers, leading nobles, and royal bastards.38  Despite this the Burgundy Circle’s position at 
court and proximity to both the king and Bourgogne made them a powerful group.39  Not least, 
because unlike many of the members of the other two cabals, the Circle’s members were actively 
preparing reform plans for France rather than jostling for positions and personal rewards.  This 
leads to the (inadequate) historiographical debate concerning the nature of the Burgundy Circle 
and its subsequent ideology.  Most commentators have argued that the Circle was one cohesive 
group possessing one unified philosophy.40  For some, those around Bourgogne were peddling a 
reactionary aristocratic agenda that would have restored the traditional feudal rights of the épée 
but retained the absolutist monarchical system France had erected.  The aim of the Circle was to 
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restore some of the assistance the épée formerly provided for the king while undermining the 
gathering power of the ministry.41  Other commentators have rejected this reactionary 
interpretation and also recognised that the Circle was not made up of a unified group of 
individuals, but they still regard their ideology to be uniform aristocratic reform.42  While it is 
true that all of the Circle’s plans do include the aristocracy and that the idea of polysnody is 
prevalent throughout their works, there is actually great diversity in their theory and intentions.  
As will be shown below through the ideas of these members, the Circle was a loose grouping of 
individuals with varying perceptions on the future of French monarchy. 
 
IV 
The educationalists that surrounded Bourgogne as a child formed the central group of the 
Burgundy Circle: Beauvilliers, Chevreuse, Fleury, and the key figure of Fénelon.43  Fénelon is 
repeatedly referred to as the leader or crucial figure of the Burgundy Circle; partly because of his 
leading role as Bourgogne’s tutor and pedagogue, partly due to his influence over the other 
educationalists, and partly because of his later intellectual legacy and reputation, aided in no small 
degree by the publication of Télémaque (published 1699), which was written for Bourgogne as a 
boy.  Indeed, much of Fénelon’s legacy as a political theorist has been taken from the 
educational works written for the young Bourgogne: the Fables (1689 - 91), Dialogues des Morts 
(1692 - 95), and Télémaque (1693 - 94).  This older generation within the Circle formed a close 
bond with the prince that lasted for the remainder of his life.  These men continued to advise 
him until his death and it is believed that they would have formed part of his government had 
they all outlived Louis XIV.44  Importantly, there is much truth in the suggestion that these 
educationalists essentially indoctrinated Bourgogne from a young age.  Initially this was to 
overcome his irascible childhood temper.45 But later it is dynastic motivations that played a part. 
When the Circle saw much advice to reform government (largely from Fénelon) rebuffed by 
12 
 
Louis XIV, they saw an opportunity to be more successful in their endeavours by shaping the 
future king.46  
     Fénelon’s three pedagogical works set out a number of key themes that were continually 
revisited by the prelate throughout Bourgogne’s life.  These were lessons in kingship, war and 
commerce, plus the two state grievances of tyranny and luxury.  Fénelon’s king was one who 
concentrated his labours on the welfare of his subjects and their liberty, beyond anything else, 
including his own personal interest.47  Permeated by virtue and duty, the king acted as a moral 
example to his people, supported by an understanding of his country, its laws and its history.48  
Such wisdom was accumulated through study, as well as an awareness of the nations’ current 
situation.  This was ensured by a king not isolating himself from his subjects in a palace or 
behind obsequious flatterers and ministers concerned only with their own profit.  A king must 
not lose sight of the vicissitudes of his people or be carried away by thoughts of his own glory 
(gloire), particularly through destructive wars.  It was the peaceful king who acted virtuously, 
becoming a friend and mediator to his neighbours rather than engaging in hubristic jingoism.49  
To nurture the public good a state must be peaceful and filled with plenty, ‘like a garden’.50  In 
order to achieve this, government must employ it subjects industriously through trade and 
agriculture to galvanise a productive (whole) nation.   
     This explained why Fénelon underlined the two grievances for Bourgogne of tyranny and 
luxury.51  Tyranny was the absolute will of a king without any ‘bridle’ for his passions.  The ability 
for one man to possess such power was dangerous and could not be trusted, as the individual 
king may focus on his own needs over the common good.  Added to this concern was the 
danger that a king would be deceived by flatterers at court and in government.  Such men would 
not reveal the true situation of the kingdom because they were too focused on their own 
advantage rather than the public good, a situation akin to Louis’s government.  It was thereby 
imperative that a king’s power should be limited,52 through virtuous advisers (based on merit 
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rather than social background), independent ministers, and the use of wider government 
institutions.53  Fénelon was later to admit to Bourgogne that these elements of government had 
been allowed to atrophy by kings.54  A view of history that was shared by Fleury, who pointed to 
medieval Germanic (Gothic) French law that ensured kings held annual meetings with the 
nobility, Church and third estate to discuss government.   Over time and particularly in the 
seventeenth century the parlements and other courts had become ‘useless’ in France,55 but both 
Fleury and Fénelon felt wider consultation was essential for the state’s health.     
     The grievance of luxury reflected a European debate and concern with the development of 
commercial society in the seventeenth century.  Télémaque’s assault on luxury rued its damaging 
effects on the agricultural base of Salente (France), as the population moved to the country to 
engage in the trade in luxuries.  For Fénelon luxury had mired individuals and the (high) nobility 
in indolence and effeminacy, but more importantly it threatened the stability of society and 
weakened the state.56  In the quest for Mammon people of all classes lost sight of what was 
important in life, thereby overturning the type of state like Holland (Tyre) that Fénelon favoured.  
Such a state was open to commerce but contained no idleness, as it was industrious, sober, 
frugal, and run by a well-regulated administration.  Fénelon’s application of classical civic virtue 
saw an attempt to repulse contemporary social problems using ancient thought, as he fused a 
classical vision of duty with Christian morality.57  His vision in the pedagogical works had been 
influenced by the thought of his sub-preceptor, Fleury, who had put forward a Christian 
agrarianism that opposed the mercantilism of the seventeenth century and Colbert.58  Building 
on Fleury’s agricultural views and belief in the need for a ruler to improve the virtue and 
happiness of his people,59 they set out to shape the young prince’s education.  In so doing, they 
criticised the reforms of Colbert which had focused on commercial policies.  These had placed 
an emphasis on the requirement for exports to exceed imports in an attempt to introduce more 
foreign coinage into France to permit direct and indirect taxation as money circulated 
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throughout the state.  Through the state control of commercial activity this bellicose 
protectionism endeavoured to monopolise limited European coinage and maximise profit: a 
doctrine seen by Colbert as ‘une guerre d’argent’ (‘a war of money’) or weapon of war.60  The 
failure of Colbert’s (peacetime) policies as France engaged in European wars from 1672 
instigated the (Christian) agrarianism and free trade seen in Fleury and Fénelon who saw the 
neglect of agriculture.61  Bound up in this rejection of mercantilism was the ravages and misery 
caused by the Nine Years’ War (1689 - 97) intensified by French famines during the 1690s.62  
Fénelon’s reaction to the ostensible neglect of the public good and agricultural life was 
transposed to the pedagogical works, delivering a corrective for contemporary France and by 
effectively showing Louis XIV’s grandson how not to rule.63  
     After a brief separation from Bourgogne due to Fénelon’s exile at Cambrai in 1699 over the 
Quietism Affair, the two men re-established contact in 1701.64  Over the next decade Fénelon 
drafted a number of works for the prince and others, predominantly fretting over the continued 
War of the Spanish Succession (1701 – 1714) and the requirement to cease hostilities.65  This 
repulsion of war may have been expected from an Archbishop, but Fénelon had experienced the 
war and suffering first-hand at Cambrai because his diocese was on the frontline.  When 
Bourgogne became Dauphin in 1711, Fénelon with Chevreuse composed the Plans de 
Gouvernement or Tables de Chaulnes (named after the chateau in which they were written) planning 
for the future.  A return to the childhood themes is evident as they set out their vision of a 
reformed France.  The first order of business was to end the war at all costs, even if this meant 
the humiliation of France.66  This would be swiftly followed by a reduction in the size of the 
army so that France could no longer participate in European general wars, instead concentrating 
on alliances.  State expenditure would be audited.  Wasteful court expenses would be kerbed and 
sumptuary laws placed on luxury items in an attempt to resolve and pay the king’s debts.67  To 
augment state revenues, a Council of Trade would be created to control commercial policy and 
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promote free trade, as France boosted its economy through manufactures and commerce rather 
than luxury and finance.  In order to accomplish this, there would be a wholesale reform of the 
state.  Assietes (small assemblies in each diocese) would be established under the Bishop, local 
nobility and Third Estate to collect tax.  Provincial estates would be revitalised along the lines of 
Languedoc.68  Run by the three estates, they would be given the power to ‘police, correct, and 
direct funds’ while adjusting taxation, enabling trade, and allowing deputies to debate local 
issues.69  As part of this decentralisation programme, the Estates-General would be reconvened, 
regularly meeting so that provincial issues could be debated at a national level.  The Estates-
General would not only have the responsibility for reviewing finances, trade, and ‘warlike 
enterprises’; it and a number of polysynodic councils would advise the king and correct abuses.70  
The parlements would have the prestige of their office returned to them, and the nobility would 
be allowed to enter the magistrature and trade to assist in the rejuvenation of France.71   
     These plans were never enacted because Bourgogne died within five months of their creation 
(18 February 1712), leaving the older members of the group desolate from his loss.  Yet Fénelon 
quickly roused himself and developed a plan for Bourgogne’s surviving son (the future Louis 
XV), which he believed they owed to the prince’s memory.  In the Mémoire sur les mesures à prendre 
après la mort du duc de Bourgogne (15 March 1712), Fénelon’s aim was to develop a regency council 
while obtaining immediate peace to create internal security.72  After Louis’s seventy-two year 
reign, Fénelon believed it to be imperative that the French people should be familiarised with a 
new government prior to the old king’s demise.  A regency council would therefore operate 
alongside Louis XIV to familiarise the French people with the new form of government, 
assuaging the shock of losing the king and prevent the potential return of the king of Spain 
(Bourgogne’s brother Philippe).  Louis XIV would invest the new body with the authority to run 
the state with the king, providing it with the legitimacy necessitated in the people’s eyes for after 
Louis XIV’s death.  It would headed by the duc de Berry (Bourgogne’s youngest brother) and 
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contain Chevreuse, Beauvilliers, Saint-Simon, as well as the ducs de Chaulnes, de Tallard, de 
Villeroy plus some ministers and secretaries of state.  The king should immediately authorise the 
council in an assembly of notables and register it with the parlement de Paris, as its members 
swore an oath to the king and to Berry.  The council would be consistent with the ‘government 
of the nation’, and perform a secondary role of taking charge of the young prince’s education.73  
Notably, the duc d’Orléans was not to be included in the council because Fénelon felt that he 
was dominated by his daughter.  The council working closely with the Estates-General and 
parlement would begin the reorganisation of government.  It would continue to assist the 
Dauphin when he reached maturity, sanctioning France to expand from absolutism to establish 
wider government.  Fénelon impressed the need to inculcate the idea of a regency council on the 
king instantly to save France from ruin.74  He persuaded Beauvilliers to approach the king via 
Madame de Maintenon, but the king declined the idea.  This terminated the ambitions of this 
group of educators to effect their reformation of France at close quarters, and before Louis 
XIV’s death in 1715 Fénelon, Chevreuse and Beauvilliers were all dead. 
V 
From the 1690s until the end of the Régence (1723), Saint-Simon’s Mémoires observed the 
behaviour and intrigues of the court. Significantly, they expose the duc’s relationship with 
Bourgogne when Dauphin, and reveal their preparations for the reorganisation of France and an 
alternate vision from Fénelon’s new administration.75  Saint-Simon’s proximity to Louis XIV at 
court had left him with an uncomplimentary view of the monarch, amplified by frustration over 
the damage of an ineffective government.  Saint-Simon placed much of the blame with the king, 
whom he described as ‘vainglorious,’ dominated by ambition, glory, and a love of war.  Deeming 
the king to be below average intelligence, and prone to suspicion of those with ‘intellect, 
education, nobility of sentiment, and high principles,’76  he claimed that Louis chose poor 
ministers to avoid being overwhelmed or vulnerable.  Compounding this was recognition from 
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the king’s ministers, generals, and courtiers of his love for admiration, which they flattered to 
achieve their ambitions often for their own personal advantage rather than that of the state.  This 
incompetent running of government had been further encumbered by a dependence on a limited 
group of self-interested ministers.  They had crippled France’s finances during the War of the 
Spanish Succession - worsened by a bad winter (1708/9) – and left the already suffering poor 
bearing the brunt of poor fiscal organisation.77   
     Saint-Simon and Bourgogne began working on their plans to reform France soon after he 
became Dauphin.  Saint-Simon remarked on the prince’s improved confidence and popularity 
following the death of his father, as the two men had not got on and their respective cabals had 
been hostile towards one another.78  Upon becoming Dauphin, Bourgogne’s meetings with Saint-
Simon to reform France as king began relatively quickly.  According to Saint-Simon, both men 
were of a similar view on the necessity to alter the monarchy and administration of France.79  
There was a shared desire to overthrow the structure spawned by Richelieu and Mazarin.  The 
central target of the two cardinals had been the epée, who had been ‘annihilated’ within the state.  
By promoting the administrators and members of the robe the great nobles of France had been 
left without power as government was placed into the hands of the plebeians.  François Le 
Tellier, Marquis de Louvois (1641 – 1691), the Secretary of State for War was especially singled 
out as a Machiavellian minister who had isolated the king for his own personal gain.80  Typifying 
the poor management of the state and scheming found in the robe ministry.  Saint-Simon and 
Bourgogne’s objective was to overcome maladministration by introducing the epée back into the 
ministry in accordance with the fundamental laws and customs of the kingdom, while removing 
the robe from government.  With the exception of the judiciary, by degrees the robe nobility 
would be dismissed from the administration.   
     This agenda was made very clear in the Projets de Gouvernement.  Saint-Simon highlighted 
Bourgogne’s readiness to rule France, and his time spent studying for his future role as king.  
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Fortified by truth and justice, Bourgogne desired to sanctify the public good over his own 
interests.81  Such eschewing of Louis XIV’s narcissistic cult of personality manifested the 
influence of the Circle’s educationalists on the prince.  His first actions as king would be to 
alleviate the suffering of his people through the modification of the state, particularly its dire 
financial abuses.  To eradicate government mismanagement, France would be divided into 
twelve provinces each containing its own estate comprising members from the three orders.  
These provincial estates would filter information to the Estates-General, which would meet 
every four years and contain several members from the provincial estates.  The purpose of this 
governmental network was to gather information on the entire kingdom so it could shape the 
king’s policy.  Decisions made centrally would be returned to these provincial estates through the 
deputies involved in the Estates-General.82  The parlements and other superior courts would 
both be incorporated in this process, although there was a stress on the requirement to 
reorganise the courts (justice) and to decrease the disproportionate size of the parlement de 
Paris.  Saint-Simon argued for the necessity of destroying the factions dominating the parlement 
de Paris, a process supported by the creation of two new parlements in Moulins and Poitiers.83   
     The Projets wanted to streamline government spending by trimming wasted bureaucracy to 
provide much needed revenue.  An immediate introduction of free trade would be maintained by 
a reduction of taxation levies to ease the burden on the people.  Prioritising the state’s debt 
accumulated over Louis’s long reign, the Estates-General would be tasked with finding a solution 
for the fiscal difficulties; i.e. whether to increase taxes or declare a state bankruptcy.84  Through 
government reorganisation its ancient apparatus would be rejuvenated, guaranteeing a wider 
structure at the top of the ministry.  Louis XIV had limited to approximately five men the 
number of people he relied upon at the top of government.  In the opinion of Saint-Simon and 
Bourgogne this damaged France, as a king required a broader range of opinion when making 
policy, while also using more officials to share the workload of state.  This burden would be 
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lightened by the introduction of seven main councils – of the Church, of foreign affairs, of war, 
of the marine, of finances, of dispatches, and of order – plus a number of subsidiary councils.85  
Led by and filled with members of the epée, a polysynody would stimulate the state by redressing 
its maladies and returning ‘order, decency, honour’ and dignity to the kingdom.86  Fundamentally, 
the king would remain firmly in command of the state.  He would control the finances, make all 
of the important decisions aided by the conseil d’état plus a few chosen ministers.  So while 
Bougogne’s épée-led government would be more inclusive than his grandfather’s and safeguard 
the superior connection of the entire kingdom, the polysynody was predominantly an advisory 
body at the highest level.87  
     Bourgogne and Saint-Simon’s reform thereby diverged from Fénelon’s plans in their purpose 
and capacity, although the reinvigoration of the estates and provincial government network did 
contain a good deal of overlap.   Both strategies hoped to generate a more accurate 
representation of France’s affairs while trusting a larger selection of administrators to relieve the 
burden of office to promote the public good.  But for Fénelon there was a much stronger 
emphasis on the enlargement of government to restrain the king’s abuse of his subjects via 
unlimited power.  In Saint-Simon’s Projets the councils were less aspiring in their objectives.  
There was a requirement, presumably in Bourgogne, to preserve the authority of his grandfather 
but to use the councils as an expedient for intelligence and the organisation of the 
administration.88  The Projets perhaps offer a more realistic vision of what was likely to have 
transpired in France than Fénelon’s Tables had Bourgogne reigned.  Bourgogne’s input into 
Saint-Simon’s future France reveal a future king more in keeping with the existing state model 
and a modernising society.  While Colbert’s mercantilism was rejected in favour of free trade to 
increase state revenues, the Projets did not discuss the prohibition of luxury; in fact luxury was 
not mentioned.  What can be deduced from the Board of Commerce’s employment of 
merchants from all the main commercial centres to assist domestic and foreign trade; is that it 
20 
 
would be unlikely to have sanctioned sumptuary laws on luxury goods.89  War was also not 
excluded as an option.  In fact the navy was to be expanded to increase commercial activity in 
emulation of the English and Dutch, perhaps further undermining Fénelon’s anti-luxury moral 
stance.  As both states had profited greatly in terms of wealth and power from the development 
of their navies, which had benefited their trade in peace and the state in war.90  Saint-Simon’s 
Projets are thereby more reflective of the attempts made by Louis XIV’s own ministers to reform 
government as seen in the Board of Commerce, as well as Pontchartrain’s views.91 
     After the death of Bourgogne, like Fénelon, Saint-Simon did not rest upon his laurels.  Once 
it became clear that his childhood friend Philippe II, duc de Orléans (1674 - 1723) would 
become regent he immediately began to impress on him the necessity of following Bourgogne’s 
designs.  He urged the Regent to move away from the use of ministers in favour of councils 
within his regency administration.  According to Saint-Simon (and a number of historians) 
Orléans, as an acolyte of Fénelon bought into this polysynodic vision.92  The application with 
polysynody persuaded Saint-Simon to accept a position in the Supreme Council during the 
Régence, but his optimism quickly faded when Orléans abandoned it in 1718.  While there may 
have been a genuine interest on the part of the Regent to promote broader government, it has 
been claimed that using the polysynody was motivated by Orléans’s own objectives.  He agreed 
to the wider implementation of the polysynody in order that the parlements would void Louis 
XIV’s will which had placed limitations on his control of Louis XV’s education.  Polysynody 
incorporated the parlements in Orléans’s plans as well as the épée who filled the councils, thus 
providing the regent with allies against those who supported his enemies, namely Louis XIV’s 
legitimised bastard the duc de Maine (1670 – 1736), and King Philippe V of Spain.  Critically the 
polysynody was not given the opportunity to see how successful it may have been, and was used 
solely as an advisory body.93  Its seven specialised councils – foreign affairs, war, marine, finance, 
the interior, religion and commerce – did not form part of the royal council, could not issue 
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decrees, and the Regent was not present at its meetings.  By 1718 Orléans was able to cease the 
polysynodies by reverting to Louis XIV’s seventeenth century sovereignty, which later moved 
towards the reinstitution of First Ministers under Cardinal Dubois (1656 - 1723) in the 1720s.  
Saint-Simon withdrew from government depressed by the final abandonment of the Circle’s 
polysynodic ambitions for wider government, additionally dismayed by Orléans poor comparison 
with Bourgogne.  Orléans is therefore pivotal to the history of the polysynody in France, but in a 
different manner envisaged by previous historians. Rather than experimenting with the 
innovation of a polysynody Orléans exploited an innovation already employed under Louis 
XIV’s regime, but gave it a Burgundy Circle spin. His polysynody incorporated the high nobility 
to essentially buy them off cheaply as he also appealed to the parlements (via wider government) 
to nullify Maine as a threat.  Once Orléans’s position had been consolidated he abandoned the 
polysynodies stifling the ambitions of the Burgundy Circle as well as any innovations they or 
Louis XIV’s ministry planned: hence Saint-Simon’s disappointment. 
VI 
The final member of the Burgundy Circle, who also became disillusioned with the lost promise 
of the Régence was the abbé de Saint-Pierre.  Saint-Pierre’s interest in government and 
economics began in the early 1690s, and influenced by both Vauban and Boisguilbert nurtured a 
conviction in peace, free trade and utility.  To gain experience he had attended the conseil 
dépêches from 1702, and by 1708 was consulted by Louis XIV in the conseil d’état.94  This 
background provided him with a strong appreciation of the apparatus of state.  Guided by 
Fénelon, he incorporated a number of works (including Télémaque) into his ideas on perpetual 
peace and the polysynody, which advocated a move away from Louis XIV’s absolutism.  Saint-
Pierre’s most celebrated work was the Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe (1712).95  
Disheartened by Louis XIV’s reign and the economic difficulties exacerbated by protracted war, 
he claimed to have been inspired by the people’s suffering during the War of the Spanish 
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Succession,96 and a desire to end future conflicts without war.97  Saint-Pierre’s scientific 
methodology has been proclaimed as a form of proto-utilitarianism,98 guided by the principle of 
delivering happiness for the people by maximising the public good.99   
     Based on the duc de Sully’s description of Henri IV’s Grand Dessein,100  Saint-Pierre wanted to 
unite European states through law by creating a peace union in which they were protected, 
possessed rights and could enjoy prosperity.  ‘Perpetual peace’ was driven by the realisation that 
if states were not pre-occupied with war its taxation and the time it expended on fighting could 
be more constructively spent.   Not only could the arts and sciences be greatly enhanced, but 
commerce would flourish.  This could be exploited as the greatest vehicle to harness the energies 
of the people for enriching the state.101  Rejecting Louis XIV’s policy of war that had 
handicapped French trade - especially foreign trade which accounted for one third of the total 
income of France - Saint-Pierre followed Boisguilbert, Fleury and Fénelon in discouraging the 
ideas of Montchrétien and Colbert’s mercantilism in favour of free trade.  He noted that war 
offered an obvious barrier to trade, and destroyed positive state interaction.  War directed 
subjects away from agriculture and trade and diminished the number of subjects within a 
kingdom.  Saint-Pierre rebuffed the mercantile perceptions that France was depended upon by 
other states as Europe’s breadbasket, and that it was able to exist through autarchy.  He 
considered this confidence to be erroneous and dangerously conceited, trusting that France 
would be substantially enhanced by foreign trade.102  Foreign trade in a European confederacy 
would not only encourage prosperity through commerce, it would ensure utility for both the 
state and the public (good).103  Fleury and Fénelon’s (Christian) agrarian-based commercial 
activity was shunned in favour of the greater wealth generated by the trade in luxury goods, 
which would bring greater prosperity to society.104  Saint-Pierre’s early eighteenth century 
scientific vision contained in numerous Projets grasped the universal value of peace to commercial 
endeavour and human association.   
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     Saint-Pierre applied this scientific approach to his promotion of government councils as he 
attempted to salvage the concept during the Régence in the Discours sur la Polysynodie.105  Saint-
Pierre’s version of the polysynody possessed greater ambition than Fénelon or Saint-Simon’s 
projects, or that of Pontchartrain.  Saint-Pierre considered a polysynody was essential to remove 
the threat of the realm returning to the domination of one or two key ministers: a single ‘Grand 
visir’ (Richelieu or Mazarin) or two ‘Demi-visirs’ (Colbert and Louvois) that controlled the king 
for their own ends and power.106  To prevent such behaviour, government must be enlarged so 
that it became more inclusive while employing the unused épée to head the ministry.  While the 
system would utilise the external ranking system of the robe nobility, membership of the 
polysynody would be reliant on talent and application, making it meritocratic and open.  This 
more inclusive organisation would subsume private interest as the councils and administrators of 
state were expected to work co-operatively for the public good.107   The reliance on talent would 
generate an environment of emulation and competition.  Posts would be circulated within the 
system, creating competition between departments and individuals to increase productivity and 
standards as the ministers monitored their own work and that of others.  Circulation of offices 
enabled the ministers and administrators to acquaint themselves with all aspects of government 
including the provinces of the kingdom as they moved around.108  Saint-Pierre’s aim was to 
augment efficiency, knowledge and professionalism of the government to elevate the public 
good which had been absent under Louis XIV.  Evolving beyond Fénelon’s idea of the use of 
councils, Saint-Pierre argued that the government should elect its own representative or 
president every three years.  Developing from the regency council after the king’s minority the 
president, or head of the council, would supervise the business of administration directed by the 
king.109  The enrichment of the polysynody would protect the king from usurpation or 
revolution, as the most politically talented members of the nobility or wider populace were 
engaged within the system.110  The rewards and distraction of the role within the polysynody 
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would distract the individual from ideas of resistance to the king, and garner a spirit of service to 
the public good. 
     It has been claimed that Saint-Pierre’s two works were progenitors of enlightened despotism 
in France prior to the existence of these rulers in continental Europe.111 Consequently, Saint-
Pierre preferred ‘consultative despotism’ to a polity limited by reason and administrators.  His 
Polysynodie did not want to follow the Burgundy Circle liberalisation of government, rather its 
objective was to depersonalise the absolute monarch by focusing on the machine and primacy of 
law.  In so doing, Saint-Pierre also rejected Boulainvilliers’s belief in a ‘group of seigneurs’ 
rescuing French fortunes, although he did ascribe to an ‘aristo-monarchie’ via polysynody that 
would engender a top-down revival of society.112  An aristocratic-led renewal of France was one 
of the key principles that held together a Burgundy Circle that was essentially pursuing different 
agendas.  Its other mutual principles were the expansion of government and the use of councils 
(polysynody).  Yet pointedly, Saint-Pierre’s polysynody destabilised the sovereign authority of the 
king by sponsoring a mixed form of government.  Irrespective of the advantages to the king (or 
Orléans), such an arrangement dramatically broadened government and endorsed a potentially 
rival leadership under a president.  Working in tandem with the king, over time the monarch’s 
power would inevitably become mitigated (to an unknown extent) by the progressions of 
administration.  The members of the Burgundy Circle were not promoting a British model of 
mixed government, but both Fénelon and Saint-Pierre’s views would have significantly extended 
participation in government to a degree that would have undermined French absolutism.   
VII 
The notion that the Burgundy Circle did not wish to undermine the system of Louis XIV, in 
which they operated, only really pertained to Saint-Simon and Bourgogne.  In all probability, this 
would have been the form of administration sanctioned had Bourgogne reigned as king of 
France.  But it would still have progressed beyond the ministry’s narrower polysynodic 
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innovation with a still heavy reliance on a limited group of (robe) ministers, who were blamed by 
Saint-Simon and Bourgogne for France’s ills and were to be replaced by the épée in government.  
Both Fénelon and Saint-Pierre’s plans went further.  Fénelon (and the other educationalists) 
considered the king – and not just his ministers - to be responsible for the damaging policies of 
his state. The monarchy that existed under Louis XIV had to be overhauled in order to mollify 
and restrain future kings for the public good.  This would be accomplished by expanding 
government by broadening and consolidating the centre’s connections with provincial 
government.  Saint-Pierre went further still.  His view was one that recognised the deficiencies of 
Louis XIV’s reign and applied a scientific methodology that reconfigured government to 
promote utility and happiness through a quasi-modern state that would have eventually 
embraced mixed sovereignty.  These three reforming agendas permit four concluding points.  
Firstly, the shared liberalising principles of the Burgundy Circle reveal that the group was not 
pursuing a reactionary return to pre-seventeenth century feudal aristocratic power.  Secondly, 
despite some overlap in their ideas (notably the polysynody), the Circle did not possess one 
cohesive ideology; rather a set of ideas influenced by proximity to the crown and (Christian) 
ethical reforming considerations.  These differing perspectives on the call for wider government 
exposed the shared sentiment that, thirdly, the épée were deemed to have been excluded by 
Louis XIV.  All the members of the Circle placed varying degrees of blame on the power of the 
robe and the absence of the épée in government on the present predicament of France.  Lastly, 
the king’s ability to forge a model of sovereignty that enabled this was discerned to have emerged 
from the king’s control and independence within the constitution.  His manipulation of the 
constitution via prerogatives had not only side-lined the épée from government policy it had 
eroded the other ancient institutions that added balance in the state for the public good.   
     Contrary to revisionist claims therefore, Louis XIV’s sovereignty was perceived by 
contemporaries to have been tyrannical and ‘absolutist’ in nature, regardless of his inability to 
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centralise France fully.  However, the development of polysynody within Louis XIV’s 
government in the Board of Commerce and as Pontchartrain’s potential regency option, reveal 
that the French monarchy was attempting to adapt along traditional lines in accordance with 
other European monarchies.  Consequentially this means that although the Burgundy Circle did 
not create the concept of the polysynody, they were utilising contemporary ideas within their 
own plans rather than looking backwards.  Their use of the high nobility at the centre of these 
reforms is less of an aristocratic reaction, and more of a case of revitalising an alternative 
traditional path that not only placed the épée at heart of government but also widened 
government participation in the people through its ancient institutions.  This expansion would 
have far eclipsed that of Louis XIV’s ministry, and significantly was designed to galvanise the 
bien public at a time of hardship within the kingdom and administrative deficiency coupled with 
financial catastrophe.  Such an acknowledgment of the public good had been lacking under Louis 
XIV and was absent within the ministry’s alternative polysynodies.  The employment of the 
aristocracy then, was not conservative it was a methodology for overturning the problems of the 
(robe) administration while embracing contemporary political thought in Europe.    
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58 See Rothkrug, Opposition to Louis XIV, 243-45; and Rothband, “The liberal reaction”, 263. 
59 Claude Fleury, “Réflexions sur Machiavel”, 564-65.  
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politique, 35-39.  It was opposed by an associate of the Circle, Pierre le Boisguilbert, who advocated free trade as a 
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Louis XIV, xiii, 557; and Ladurie, The Ancien Régime, 266. 
63 Fénelon disputed the idea that he was satirising the king in the educational works; see Oeuvres de Fénelon, Tome III 
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he was effectively banished by the king to Cambrai.  Bourgogne instigated the renewed contact; see Bourgogne au 
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65 At this time Fénelon created a perpetual peace plan in the Supplément to the Examen de conscience - also known as 
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66 Fénelon, Tables de Chaulnes, 1085. 
67 Ibid., 1088. 
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Society, 336-37; and Durand, Jouanna, and Pélaquier (eds.), Des Etats dans l’Etat. 
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